Analysis of a Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystem and Its Application in Software Copy Protection

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Abstract—We analysed and solved possible singularity for an improved MFE multivariate public key (Medium Field Multivariate Public Key Encryption) and studied the use of it in software copy protection. We used our new MFE multivariate public key cryptosystem to design an algorithm of software registration, in which a given plaintext can result in multi-cipher-text. The breaking is hard because the ciphertext is variable. The ability to withstand algebraic attacks is enhanced. The dependence of registration string on the fingerprints of machine prevents any registration string from being shared by multiple machines.

Index Terms—Multivariate, Public key, Software protection, Finite field

I. INTRODUCTION

The well known public key [1] cryptography RSA [2] [3] has been widely used for decades. However, such a system based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers is being potentially threatened: In 1999, Peter Shor developed algorithms to crack integer factorization and discrete logarithm in polynomial time for a quantum computer [6]. Therefore, once the come out of quantum computers, public key cryptography based on large integer factorization and discrete logarithm will be unpractical. To solve this problem, we need to study new approaches. Among them, multivariate public key cryptosystem is a research direction [5], which uses finite field multivariable (quadratic or higher ordered) set of polynomials, as a public key cryptosystem. As early as 1986, Fell and Diffie proposed a invertible linear mapping within a simple triangle synthesis scheme [7]. Although they claimed the safety of the program, Courtois and Goubin found the method to break it with the method of minimum rank [13]; In 1988, Matsumoto and Imai designed multivariate quadratic polynomial scheme implemented via a Frobenius mapping [5]. Although this program was later denied by Patarin [8], this work led multivariate cryptography in many studies [5]. In 1995, Patarin proposed a hidden field equation method (HFE) [17], in 1997 and 1999, Jean-Charles broke HFE respectively in 2001 and 2003 with the method of minimum rank [13] [18]. In 2006, Lih-Chung Wang et al. proposed an intermediate domain multivariate public key cryptosystem MFE (Medium-Field Multivariate Public Key Encryption) [11], which belongs to a multivariate quadratic polynomial scheme. In 2007, Zhiwei Wang et al. analysed and developed Lih-Chung Wang et al.’s programs to make the cryptosystem safer [4]. In this paper, we take Zhiwei Wang et al.’s scheme as a basis to design software registration scheme. Registration key security depends on the security of the encryption and decryption algorithms. The developments of Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystem inspired us to try to apply it in software copy protection. We develop software protection scheme based on multivariate public key cryptosystem from existing scheme based on RSA public key cryptosystem [12]. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces original scheme of MFE and its improvements; Section 3 designs the scheme of software copy protection based on our improved MFE; Section 4 gives experimental results and analysis of the application; Section 5 gives conclusions.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEMES

Preliminaries [1]: Let \( \mathbb{K} \) be a finite field of characteristic 2 and \( L \) be its degree \( r \) extension field. Let \( q = |\mathbb{K}| \), \( l = |L| \). In MFE and its improvement, we always identify \( \mathbb{L} \) with \( \mathbb{K}^r \) by a \( \mathbb{K} \)-linear isomorphism \( \pi: \mathbb{L} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^r \). Namely we take a basis of \( \mathbb{L} \) over \( \mathbb{K} \): \{\( \theta_1, \theta_2, \cdots, \theta_r \)\} and define \( \pi \) by

\[
\pi(a_1 \theta_1 + \cdots + a_r \theta_r) = (a_1, \cdots, a_r)
\]

for any \((a_1, \cdots, a_r)\). It is natural to extend \( \pi \) to two \( \mathbb{K} \)-linear isomorphisms \( \pi_1: \mathbb{L}^{12} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^{12r} \) and \( \pi_3: \mathbb{L}^{15} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^{15r} \).

A. The Original MFE Scheme

In Lih-Chung Wang et al.’s original MFE scheme [11], its encryption mapping \( F: \mathbb{K}^{12r} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^{15r} \) is a composition of three mappings \( \phi_1, \phi_2, \phi_3 \).

Let

\[
\begin{align*}
(x_1, \cdots, x_{12r}) &= \phi_1(m_1, \cdots, m_{12r}), \\
(y_1, \cdots, y_{15r}) &= \phi_2(x_1, \cdots, x_{12r}), \\
(z_1, \cdots, z_{15r}) &= \phi_3(y_1, \cdots, y_{15r}).
\end{align*}
\]
where $\phi_1$ and $\phi_3$ are invertible affine mappings, $\phi_2$ is a central map, which is equal to $\pi_1 \circ \phi_2 \circ \pi_3^{-1}$, and $\phi_1 \phi_2$ and $\phi_3$ are taken as the private key, while the expression of the mapping $(z_1, \cdots, z_{15r}) = \Phi(m_1, \cdots, m_{12r})$ is the public key. The mapping $\phi_2 : L^{12} \rightarrow L^{15}$ is defined as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
Y_1 &= X_1 + X_5X_8 + X_6X_7 + Q_1; \\
Y_2 &= X_2 + X_9X_{12} + X_{10}X_1 + Q_2; \\
Y_3 &= X_3 + X_9X_4 + X_2X_3 + Q_3; \\
Y_4 &= X_1X_5 + X_2X_7; Y_7 = X_1X_6 + X_2X_8; \\
Y_6 &= X_3X_5 + X_4X_7; Y_7 = X_3X_6 + X_4X_8; \\
Y_8 &= X_1X_9 + X_2X_{11}; Y_6 = X_1X_{10} + X_2X_{12}; \\
Y_{10} &= X_3X_9 + X_4X_{11}; Y_{11} = X_3X_{10} + X_4X_{12}; \\
Y_{12} &= X_5X_9 + X_7X_{11}; Y_{13} = X_5X_{10} + X_7X_{12}; \\
Y_{14} &= X_6X_9 + X_8X_{11}; Y_{15} = X_6X_{10} + X_8X_{12}.
\end{align*}
\]

(1)

Here $Q_1$, $Q_2$, and $Q_3$ form a triple $(Q_1, Q_2, Q_3)$ which is a triangular mapping from $\mathbb{K}^{3r}$ to itself, used as parameters. The encryption of MFE is the evaluation of public-key polynomials, namely given a plaintext $(m_1, \cdots, m_{12r})$ its ciphertext is

\[
(z_1, \cdots, z_{15r}) = (F_1(m_1, \cdots, m_{12r}), \cdots, F_{15r}(m_1, \cdots, m_{12r})).
\]

Given a valid ciphertext $(z_1, \cdots, z_{15r})$, the decryption of the scheme is to compute the inverse mapping

\[
\phi^{-1}_1 \circ \pi_1 \circ \phi^{-1}_2 \circ \pi_3^{-1} \circ \phi^{-1}_3(z_1, \cdots, z_{15r}).
\]

The key problem is to compute the inverse mapping $\phi^{-1}_2$. Given known elements $Y_j \in \mathbb{L}$, $1 \leq j \leq 15$, and agreed triple $(Q_1, Q_2, Q_3)$. We can restore $X_i \in \mathbb{L}$, $1 \leq i \leq 12$, as follows.

Let

\[
M_1 = \begin{pmatrix} X_1 & X_2 \\ X_3 & X_4 \\ X_5 & X_6 \\ X_7 & X_8 \end{pmatrix},
M_2 = \begin{pmatrix} X_5 & X_6 \\ X_7 & X_8 \end{pmatrix},
M_3 = \begin{pmatrix} X_9 & X_{10} \\ X_{11} & X_{12} \end{pmatrix},
Z_1 = M_1M_2 = \begin{pmatrix} Y_4 & Y_5 \\ Y_6 & Y_7 \end{pmatrix},
Z_2 = M_1M_3 = \begin{pmatrix} Y_8 & Y_9 \\ Y_{10} & Y_{11} \end{pmatrix},
Z_3 = M_1^TM_3 = \begin{pmatrix} Y_{12} & Y_{13} \\ Y_{14} & Y_{15} \end{pmatrix}.
\]

Then we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\det(Z_1) &= \det(M_1) \cdot \det(M_2); \\
\det(Z_2) &= \det(M_1) \cdot \det(M_3); \\
\det(Z_3) &= \det(M_2) \cdot \det(M_3).
\end{align*}
\]

When $\det(Z_1), \det(Z_2)$ and $\det(Z_3)$ are all invertible, $\det(M_1), \det(M_2)$ and $\det(M_3)$ are all invertible and can be computed from (2). Namely, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\det(M_1) &= \sqrt{\frac{\det(Z_1) \cdot \det(Z_2)}{\det(Z_3)}}, \\
\det(M_2) &= \sqrt{\frac{\det(Z_1) \cdot \det(Z_2)}{\det(Z_3)}}, \\
\det(M_3) &= \sqrt{\frac{\det(Z_1) \cdot \det(Z_2)}{\det(Z_3)}}.
\end{align*}
\]

Given the values of $\det(M_1), \det(M_2)$, and $\det(M_3)$, we can compute from (1) the values of $X_1, X_2, X_3$. In the finite field $\mathbb{L}$ of characteristic 2, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
X_1 &= Y_1 + det(M_2) + Q_1; \\
X_2 &= Y_2 + det(M_2) + Q_2; \\
X_3 &= Y_3 + det(M_1) + Q_3.
\end{align*}
\]

From

\[
X_1X_4 + X_2X_3 = \det(M_1)
\]

we can determine $X_4$. With values of $\det(M_1), \det(M_2)$, and $\det(M_3)$, we can use the triangular form of the central map to get $X_i \in \mathbb{L}$, $1 \leq i \leq 12$ in turn. Then we can recover the ciphertext. More details of decryption are presented in [11]. Unfortunately, this system has weakness and needs improving [5].

B. Analysis of the Improved Scheme

Zhiwei Wang et al. proposed an improved scheme as follows. Modify the two affine mappings, i.e. the $\mathbb{K}$-linear isomorphisms $\pi_1 : \mathbb{L}^8 \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^{8r}$ and $\pi_3 : \mathbb{L}^{10} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^{10r}$.

Modify the central mapping as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
Y_1 &= X_1 + X_5X_8 + X_6X_7 + Q_1; \\
Y_2 &= X_2 + X_9X_4 + X_2X_3 + Q_2; \\
Y_3 &= X_1X_5 + X_2X_7; Y_7 = X_1X_6 + X_2X_8; \\
Y_5 &= X_3X_5 + X_4X_7; Y_7 = X_3X_6 + X_4X_8; \\
Y_7 &= X_1X_3 + X_2X_7; Y_4 = X_2X_5 + X_4X_7; \\
Y_9 &= X_1X_9 + X_4X_{11}; Y_{10} = X_2X_6 + X_1X_8.
\end{align*}
\]

where $Q_1, Q_2$ are preconcerted parameters. The encryption process is the same as that of last subsection. The decryption is described as follows.

Define operator $n(a^{(x)})$ over $2 \times 2$ matrix ring

\[
\begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix} \rightarrow (a^x, b^x, c^x, d^x)
\]

such that

\[
\begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix}^{(x)} = \begin{pmatrix} a^x & b^x \\ c^x & d^x \end{pmatrix}
\]

where $x \in \mathbb{Z}$.

Let

\[
M_1 = \begin{pmatrix} X_1 & X_2 \\ X_3 & X_4 \\ X_5 & X_6 \\ X_7 & X_8 \end{pmatrix},
M_2 = \begin{pmatrix} Y_3 & Y_4 \\ Y_5 & Y_6 \end{pmatrix},
Z_1 = M_1^{(x)}M_2 = \begin{pmatrix} Y_7 & Y_8 \\ Y_9 & Y_{10} \end{pmatrix}.
\]

In the field $\mathbb{L}$, we have $X_1^{(x)} = X_1$. The decryption sequence is

\[
\phi^{-1}_1 \circ \pi_1 \circ \phi^{-1}_2 \circ \pi_3^{-1} \circ \phi^{-1}_3(z_1, \cdots, z_{15r}).
\]

The key problem is also to compute the inverse mapping $\phi^{-1}_2$. It follows from (7) that

\[
\begin{align*}
\det(Z_1) &= [\det(M_1)]^x \cdot \det(M_2); \\
\det(Z_2) &= \det(M_1) \cdot \det(M_2).
\end{align*}
\]

and

\[
\det(M_2) = \sqrt{\frac{\det(Z_1)}{\det(Z_2)}} \cdot \det(M_1) = \frac{\det(Z_2)}{\det(Z_1)}. \tag{9}
\]
Then we can compute from (5) the values of $X_1, X_2$. In the field $L$ of characteristic 2, we have
\[
\begin{align*}
X_1 &= Y_1 + \det(M_2) + Q_1; \\
X_2 &= Y_2 + \det(M_1) + Q_2.
\end{align*}
\tag{10}
\]

Then we can compute $X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6$ by solving the linear equations
\[
\begin{align*}
\det(M_2)X_3 + Y_9X_5 + Y_7X_6 &= 0; \\
\det(M_2)X_4 + Y_10X_5 + Y_8X_6 &= 0; \\
Y_4X_5 + Y_3X_6 &= \det(M_2)X_2; \\
X_2X_3 + X_1X_4 &= \det(M_1).
\end{align*}
\tag{11}
\]

Similarly, we can compute $X_7, X_8$ by solving the linear equations
\[
\begin{align*}
Y_4X_7 + Y_3X_8 &= \det(M_2)X_1; \\
Y_6X_7 + Y_5X_8 &= \det(M_2)X_2.
\end{align*}
\tag{12}
\]

This program withstands algebraic, rank, and XL & Gröbner attacks. Further improvements are in next subsection.

**C. Further Improvements**

It follows from $X_i^l = X_i$ and (8) that
\[
\det(M_1^{(i)}) = [\det(M_1)]^l = \det(M_1)
\]

In other words, we have
\[
\det(Z_1) = \det(Z_2) = \det(M_1) \cdot \det(M_2)
\]

no matter what values $\det(M_1)$ and $\det(M_2)$ take. Formula
\[
\det(M_2) = \frac{1}{\det(Z_1)} \sqrt{\frac{\det(Z_2)}{\det(Z_2)}}
\]

is nullified because
\[
\frac{\det(Z_1)}{\det(Z_2)} = 1
\]

where 1 is the identity element of $L$. This problem is solved as follows.

Modify the two affine mappings, i.e. the $\mathbb{K}$-linear isomorphisms $\pi_1 : L^5 \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^{n_1}$ and $\pi_3 : L^{12} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}^{12r}$. Modify the central mapping as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
Y_1 &= X_1 + X_5X_8 + X_6X_7 + Q_1; \\
Y_2 &= X_2 + X_1X_4 + X_2X_3 + Q_2; \\
Y_3 &= X_1X_5 + X_2X_7; Y_4 = X_1X_6 + X_2X_8; \\
Y_5 &= X_3X_5 + X_4X_7; Y_6 = X_3X_6 + X_4X_8; \\
Y_7 &= X_1X_5 + X_3X_7; Y_8 = X_2X_5 + X_4X_7; \\
Y_9 &= X_1X_6 + X_3X_8; Y_{10} = X_2X_6 + X_4X_8; \\
Y_{11} &= X_2^2X_5^2 + X_3^2X_7^2; Y_{12} = \forall x \in L.
\end{align*}
\tag{13}
\]

The encryption process is the same as that of last subsection. The decryption is described as follows. Let
\[
M_1 = \begin{pmatrix} X_1 & X_2 \\ X_3 & X_4 \end{pmatrix},
M_2 = \begin{pmatrix} X_5 & X_6 \\ X_7 & X_8 \end{pmatrix},
\]
\[
Z_1 = M_1M_2 = \begin{pmatrix} Y_3 & Y_4 \\ Y_5 & Y_6 \end{pmatrix},
\]
\[
Z_2 = M_2^T M_1 = \begin{pmatrix} Y_7 & Y_8 \\ Y_9 & Y_{10} \end{pmatrix}
\tag{14}
\]

Then we have
\[
\det(Z_1) = \det(Z_2) = \det(M_1) \cdot \det(M_2).
\]

From (13) we have $\det(M_2) = \sqrt{11}$. It follows that
\[
\det(M_1) = \frac{\det(Z_1)}{\det(Z_2)} = \frac{\det(Z_2)}{\det(M_2)}.
\]

Then we can compute from (13) the values of $X_1, X_2$.

In the field $L$ of characteristic 2, we have
\[
\begin{align*}
X_1 &= Y_1 + \det(M_2) + Q_1; \\
X_2 &= Y_2 + \det(M_1) + Q_2.
\end{align*}
\tag{15}
\]

Then we can solve $X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6, X_7, X_8$ in the same way as mentioned in last subsection.

**Advantage of the scheme:**

In (13), $x \in L$ is a random value. This small change in $Y_j$ results in big change in $z_k, 1 \leq k \leq 12r$. A plaintext can create a lot of ciphertexts. This Camouflage technique makes the system safer. The breaking is hard because the ciphertext is variable. We will show numeric experimental results later.

**III. Using New Algorithm to Protect Software**

Now let us see how we use our new scheme to protect software copyright by using registration system. To protect software from unauthorized use, many computer programs use registration strings. We use hard disk serial be used as fingerprint of user’s hardware. Having paid the necessary fee, the user sends fingerprint relevant information to the vendor via network or another tunnel. The vendor encrypts the user’s information (plaintext) into registration string (ciphertext) and sends it back to the user. After the registration string is keyed in, verification program is invoked by the application system to check the legitimacy of the registration string. This program decrypts the ciphertext and compares it with the user’s information which is relevant to the fingerprint. The successful comparison permits the user’s registration and the user gets the permission to use the software. The advantage of the method is that it can prevent plagiarism of registration from any other legal user.

**A. Preliminaries**

Set preliminary conditions on both sides of the vendor and user:

1. A character string as a permission control string denoted by $ps$;
2. User’s name and user’s machine fingerprint denoted by $name, id$. Usually, we take hard disk serial number as the fingerprint of the user, which is grabbed automatically by user’s program and send to the vendor via network. The reason to use this serial number is clearly described by Monteiro and Erbacher in their paper[19];
3. The affine mappings which are used as private key comes from both user’s name and user’s machine fingerprint;
4. The permission string $ps$ is the plaintext;
5. The registration string $reg$ is the ciphertext;
6) Computations are in the finite field $\mathbb{L} = \mathbb{K}^n, \mathbb{K} = \mathbb{Z}_2 = \{0, 1\}$, such that $\mathbb{L}$ is the extended set of ASCII. $\forall a, b \in \mathbb{L}$, the addition is the bitwise exclusive or of $a, b$; However the multiplication of $a, b$ is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}_2[x]/f(x)$, where $f(x) = x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ is a prime polynomial over $\mathbb{Z}_2$. Details of operations of $\mathbb{Z}_2[x]/f(x)$ can be found in [14]–[16].

B. Registration string/Encryption

Input: $ps, name, id$

Output: $reg$

Algorithm:

Step 1 Format to length of 8, add ";"s to the end if necessary;

Step 2 Put $ps$ into matrix $U$; Create matrix $A_1, C_1$, where $A_1$ is invertible, $C_1$ is from $name$.

Compute

$$X = A_1 U + C_1;$$

Step 3 For (13), we compute

$$Q_1 = \sum_{j=0}^{3} id[j]/0xFF,$$

$$Q_2 = \sum_{j=3}^{0} id[j]/0xFF,$$

from $id$; compute $M_1, M_2, Z_1, Z_2$,

Step 4 Compute $Y$ from (13);

Step 5 Compute Matrix $A_3, C_3$, where $A_3$ is invertible and $C_3$ is from $id$ in reverse order;

Step 6 Compute

$$V = A_3 Y + C_3;$$

Step 7 Split values in $V$ each into to parts, each part add "A" to be assured within the range from A to P;

Step 8 Add "−" between segments;

Obtain $reg$ in the form of


C. Verification/Decryption

Input: $name, id, reg$ in the form of


Output: $ps = tester$

Algorithm:

Step 1 Remove "—" from $reg$ to get $V$;

Step 2 Merge every two characters into a hexadecimal number;

Step 3 Compute Matrix $A_3, C_3$, where $A_3$ is invertible and $C_3$ is from $id$ in reverse order;

Step 4 Compute

$$Y = A_3^{-1}(V + C_3) \text{ in } \mathbb{L};$$

Step 5 Compute $Q_1, Q_2, det(M_2)$;

$det(Z_1), det(Z_2), det(M_1), X_1, X_2$.

Step 6 Compute $X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6$;

Solve matrix equation

$$S_1 X_{(3–6)} =$$

$$\begin{pmatrix}
  \text{det}(M_2) & 0 & Y_9 & Y_7 \\
  0 & \text{det}(M_2) & Y_{10} & Y_8 \\
  0 & 0 & Y_4 & Y_3 \\
  X_2 & X_1 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
  X_3 \\
  X_4 \\
  X_5 \\
  X_6
\end{pmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{pmatrix}
  0 \\
  0 \\
  X_2 \text{det}(M_2) \\
  \text{det}(M_2)
\end{pmatrix} = T_1$$

to obtain

$$X_{(3–6)} = \begin{pmatrix}
  X_3 \\
  X_4 \\
  X_5 \\
  X_6
\end{pmatrix}.$$ 

Compute $X_7, X_8$. Solve matrix equation

$$S_2 X_{(7, 8)} = \begin{pmatrix}
  Y_4 & Y_3 \\
  Y_6 & Y_5 \\
  X_1 \text{det}(M_2) & X_3 \text{det}(M_2)
\end{pmatrix} = T_2$$

to obtain

$$X_{(7, 8)} = \begin{pmatrix}
  X_7 \\
  X_8
\end{pmatrix}.$$ 

Step 7 Put $X_1$ into matrix $X$;

Step 8 Compute $C_1$ from $name$. $A_1$ is the same as that in last subsection;

Step 9 Compute

$$U = A_1^{-1}(X + C_1);$$

Step 10 Get $ps$ from $U$;

Step 11 Remove ";"s from $ps$, if there are.

IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Suppose

$name = Hardy, id = 6RY20MRQ$,

$reg = \text{ACOPJB} - \text{JMKDPK} - \text{PBBFLC} - \text{GIJAEC}.$

A. Registration string generation

Input:

$ps = tester, name = Hardy, id = 6RY20MRQ$

Output: $reg = \text{ACOPJB} - \text{JMKDPK} - \text{PBBFLC} - \text{GIJAEC}$.

Algorithm:

Step 1 Format $ps$ from $ps = tester$ to "testver."

Step 2 Put $ps$ into matrix $U$; Create matrix $A_1, C_1$, where $A_1$ is invertible, $C_1$ is from $name$.
For (13), we compute

Step 3: Compute

\[ X = A_1 U + C_1, \]

we have

\[ X = \begin{bmatrix} 7E & 83 \\ E9 & D1 \\ CF & 65 \\ 9D & 9E \end{bmatrix}; \]

Step 4: For (13), we compute

\[ Q_1 = \left( \sum_{i,j} \text{id}[j]/0xFF \right) = 36 \]

\[ Q_2 = \left( \sum_{i,j=1} \text{id}[j]/0xFF \right) = 52 \]

from

\[ \text{id} = 6RY20MRQ, M_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 7E & E9 \\ CF & 9D \end{bmatrix}, \]

\[ Z_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 47 \\ 40 \\ 1C \end{bmatrix}, Z_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 4D \\ 22 \\ 4F \end{bmatrix}, \]

\[ \text{det}(M_1) = 4E, \text{det}(M_2) = 28, \]

\[ \text{det}(Z_1) = BE, \text{det}(Z_2) = BE \]

\[ Y = (06 F5 47 40 DB 1C 4D 2A 22 4F EC E8)^T; \]

Step 5: Compute Matrix \( A_3, C_3 \) where \( A_3 \) is invertible and \( C_3 \) is from \( \text{id} = 6RY20MRQ \) in reverse order,

\[ A_3 = (A_{31}, A_{32}) \]

\[ A_{31} = \begin{bmatrix} 41 & 61 & 81 & A1 & C1 & E1 \\ E7 & 4B & E4 & 48 & 02 & AE \\ 7E & 03 & 56 & 5B & A9 & B4 \\ BA & A3 & BF & A6 & 04 & 1D \\ 54 & DD & 9E & 52 & 79 & 58 \\ 35 & 05 & D9 & 88 & 08 & 72 \end{bmatrix}, \]

\[ A_{32} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 22 & 42 & 62 & 82 & A2 \\ 04 & A8 & E2 & 4E & E1 & 4D \\ 08 & 1A & 1D & 1F & 8D & FF \\ 10 & 09 & AB & B2 & AE & B7 \\ 20 & 19 & 7F & AB & A5 & 34 \\ 40 & 6F & 7A & 7E & B4 & D1 \\ 80 & CA & 1B & 5A & 65 & 9B \\ 2B & 41 & 0C & 66 & 1D & 77 \\ 56 & D1 & 65 & ED & 33 & 0B \\ AC & 6A & 34 & 0C & 58 & 97 \\ 73 & 60 & 9C & CE & 88 & 3E \\ E6 & 1F & 25 & 35 & 72 & 29 \end{bmatrix}; \]

\[ C_3 = (Q R M 0 2 Y R 6 Q R M 0)^T, \]

or

\[ C_3 = \begin{bmatrix} 51 & 52 & 4D & 30 & 32 & 59 & 52 & 36 & 51 & 52 & 4D & 30 \end{bmatrix}^T; \]

Step 6: Compute \( V = A_3 Y + C_3 \) to obtain

\[ V = (02 EF 91 9C A3 FA F1 15 B2 68 90 42)^T; \]

Step 7: Split each value in \( V \) into parts, each part add “A” to be assured within the range from A to P obtain

\[ V = \begin{bmatrix} A & C & O & P & J & B & J & M & K & D & P & K \\ P & B & B & F & L & C & G & L & J & A & E & C \end{bmatrix}^T \]

Step 8: Add “-” between segments.

Obtain \( \text{reg} = \)

\[ ACOPJB - JMKD PK - PBBFLC - GIJAEC. \]

B. Registration string verification

Input: \( \text{name} = \text{Hardy}, \text{id} = 6RY20MRQ \),

\( \text{reg} = \)

\[ ACOPJB - JMKD PK - PBBFLC - GIJAEC. \]

Output: \( ps = \text{testeer} \) Algorithm:

Step 1: Remove “-” from \( \text{reg} \), get

\[ V = \begin{bmatrix} A & C & O & P & J & B & J & M & K & D & P & K \\ P & B & B & F & L & C & G & L & J & A & E & C \end{bmatrix}^T \]

Step 2: Merge very two characters into a hexadecimal number, get

\[ V = \begin{bmatrix} (02 EF 91 9C A3 FA F1 15 B2 68 90 42) \end{bmatrix}^T; \]

Step 3: Compute Matrix \( A_3, C_3 \) where \( A_3 \) is invertible and \( C_3 \) is from \( \text{id} = 6RY20MRQ \) in reverse order,

\[ A_3 = (A_{31}, A_{32}) \]
\[
A_{31} = \begin{pmatrix}
41 & 61 & 81 & A1 & C1 & E1 \\
E7 & 4B & E4 & 48 & 02 & AE \\
7E & 03 & 56 & 5B & A9 & B4 \\
BA & A3 & BF & A6 & 04 & 1D \\
54 & DD & 9E & 52 & 79 & 58 \\
35 & 05 & D9 & 88 & 08 & 72 \\
81 & CE & 84 & 0C & F2 & 5B \\
26 & 4C & 37 & 5D & 10 & 7A \\
DD & D4 & 8B & 79 & B5 & A5 \\
96 & 11 & 69 & A5 & 40 & 65
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
A_{32} = \begin{pmatrix}
02 & 22 & 42 & 62 & 82 & A2 \\
04 & A8 & E2 & 4E & E1 & 4D \\
08 & 1A & 1D & 1F & 8D & FF \\
10 & 09 & AB & B2 & AE & B7 \\
20 & 19 & 7F & AB & A5 & 34 \\
40 & 6F & 7A & 7E & B4 & D1 \\
80 & CA & 1B & 5A & 65 & 9B \\
2B & 41 & 0C & 66 & 1D & 77 \\
56 & D1 & 65 & ED & 33 & 08 \\
AC & 6A & 34 & 0C & 58 & 97 \\
73 & 60 & 9C & CE & 88 & 3E \\
E6 & 1F & 25 & 35 & 72 & 29
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
C_3 = (Q R M 0 2 Y R 6 Q R M 0)^T,
\]

\[
C_3 = ( 51 52 4D 30 32 59 52 36 51 52 4D 30 )^T
\]

These are all the same as those in Step 5 of last subsection. By Gaussian elimination, compute the inverse of \( A_3 \) to obtain \( A_3^{-1} = (A_{31}^{-1}, A_{32}^{-1}) \), where

\[
A_{31}^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix}
B2 & D0 & 7E & DC & 6F & C9 \\
C5 & 8C & E7 & 50 & 4C & 17 \\
69 & 0F & 0C & D8 & 2D & FB \\
6C & 12 & 8D & DE & DF & 46 \\
81 & A2 & EF & A8 & F6 & 3E \\
45 & F3 & 5C & 8D & D3 & 80 \\
D5 & F4 & 2A & BB & 5D & 61 \\
E7 & B2 & 3A & 61 & 25 & 14 \\
04 & 96 & 6A & 6F & 6F & C5 \\
96 & DE & 2C & E7 & 3C & 50 \\
B9 & CC & 5E & 40 & 29 & 3B \\
C2 & 3A & AE & 85 & 71 & 53
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
A_{32}^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix}
0B & 46 & B1 & 86 & 4B & B3 \\
0B & A8 & 62 & 45 & 4B & 61 \\
30 & 2C & 83 & 4D & ED & 52 \\
30 & 76 & E8 & 2A & ED & D8 \\
3B & 70 & A0 & D2 & A6 & E6 \\
3B & 66 & 11 & 0F & A6 & E2 \\
3B & 88 & 50 & 06 & A6 & 53 \\
3B & 08 & B0 & 1E & A6 & D7 \\
30 & 6C & 2B & C1 & ED & 15 \\
30 & C9 & E0 & FC & ED & 66 \\
0B & 23 & F3 & BD & 4B & CC \\
0B & 9E & AE & 81 & 4B & 5B
\end{pmatrix}
\]

**Step 4** Compute

\[
Y = A_3^{-1}(V + C_3)
\]

in \( \mathbb{L} \);

**Step 5** Compute

\[
Q_1, Q_2, \det(M_2), \det(Z_1),
\]

\[
\det(Z_2), \det(M_1), X_1, X_2,
\]

\[
Q_1 = \left( \sum_{j=1}^{3}\text{id}[j]/|0x FF| \right) = 36,
\]

\[
Q_2 = \left( \sum_{j=1}^{3}\text{id}[j]/|0x FF| \right) = 52,
\]

\[
Z_1 = \left( \begin{array}{cc}
47 & 40 \\
DB & 1C
\end{array} \right),
\]

\[
Z_2 = \left( \begin{array}{cc}
4D & 2A \\
22 & 4F
\end{array} \right),
\]

\[
det(M_2) = \sqrt{EC} = 28,
\]

\[
det(Z_1) = det(Z_2) = BE,
\]

\[
det(M_1) = \frac{det(Z_2)}{det(M_2)} = \frac{BE}{28} = 4E,
\]

\[
\begin{cases}
X_1 = Y_1 + det(M_2) + Q_1 = 7E; \\
X_2 = Y_2 + det(M_1) + Q_2 = E9.
\end{cases}
\]

**Step 6** Compute \( X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6 \). Solve matrix equation

\[
S_1X_{(3\cdots6)} = \begin{pmatrix}
28 & 00 & 22 & 4D \\
00 & 28 & 4F & 2A \\
00 & 00 & 40 & 47 \\
E9 & 7E & 00 & 00
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
X_3 \\
X_4 \\
X_5 \\
X_6
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
= \begin{pmatrix}
00 \\
00 \\
AB \\
4E
\end{pmatrix}
= T_1
\]

to obtain

Compute Solve matrix equation to obtain

\[
X_{(3\cdots6)} = \begin{pmatrix}
X_3 \\
X_4 \\
X_5 \\
X_6
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
CF \\
9D
\end{pmatrix};
\]
Compute $X_7, X_8$. Solve matrix equation

$$S_2 X_{(7,8)} = \begin{pmatrix} 40 & 47 \\ 1C & DB \end{pmatrix} X_{(7,8)} = \begin{pmatrix} EF \\ DC \end{pmatrix} = T_2$$

to obtain

$$X_{(7,8)} = \begin{pmatrix} X_7 \\ X_8 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 65 \\ 9E \end{pmatrix}$$

**Step 7** Put $X_i$ into matrix $X$,

$$X = \begin{pmatrix} 7E & 83 \\ E9 & D1 \\ CF & 65 \\ 9D & 9E \end{pmatrix}$$

**Step 8** Compute $C_1$ from $name$, $A_1$ is the same as that in last subsection,

$$C_1 = \begin{pmatrix} H \\ a \\ r \\ d \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 48 & 79 \\ 61 & 48 \\ 72 & 61 \\ 64 & 72 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$A_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 30 & 70 & B0 & F0 \\ 87 & 61 & 62 & 84 \\ 05 & C0 & 6F & 2A \\ F0 & 4B & 4E & F5 \end{pmatrix},$$

by Gaussian elimination, compute

$$A_1^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} 58 & FF & 32 & 08 \\ 4D & 6A & 8A & 7B \\ 7C & 07 & 98 & 61 \\ 2E & 14 & DE & DD \end{pmatrix}$$

**Step 9** Compute

$$U = A_1^{-1}(X + C_1) = \begin{pmatrix} 54 & 76 \\ 65 & 65 \\ 73 & 72 \\ 74 & 2E \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} T \\ v \\ e \\ e \\ s \\ r \\ t \end{pmatrix}$$

**Step 10** Get $ps$ from $U$,

$$ps = "Testver.".$$  

**Step 11** Remove "." from $ps$, get $ps = "Testver"$.

**C. Analysis**

We solve the problem in the central mapping by adding two elements $Y_{11}, Y_{12}$ where $Y_{11}$ is the square of $det(M_2)$ and $Y_{12}$ is a random value. This small change in $Y_{12}$ results in big change in $z_k, 1 \leq k \leq 12r$. A plaintext can create a lot of ciphertexts. For example, when $ps = Testver, name = Hardy, id = 6RY20MRQ$, we obtain different registration strings:

$$TVPB - ACKIKA - BIBGHP - LPLKLA$$

$$DCKHCE - OOJEDI - LIKJHI$$

$$AFPMFJ - DHNLHG - JAKJNM - FAAIPI$$

$$ODHLGC - GCLGID - NPDPJB - LBJMAL$$

$$NHKKPJ - BFLOBE - OBBAMQ - DKOOHP$$

and so on. This Camouflage technique gives the adversary more difficulty and makes the system safer. The breaking is hard because the ciphertext is variable. The dependence of registration string on the fingerprints of machine prevents any registration string from being shared by multiple machines.

**V. Conclusions**

To design software copy protection algorithm based on multivariate public key cryptosystem, we choose Zhiwei Wang et al.’s scheme and solve a problem in the central mapping. In addition to solving the original problem, we also extend its new feature. This new feature makes the system safer. Experimental results and analysis show that our scheme is viable and secure.

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**References**


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